 

  

 



 

 

   

INTRODUCTION
CHARTING THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION
CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER†
In the first three years of the Trump administration, the president
nominated and the Senate confirmed 187 judges to Article III federal
courts, including two Supreme Court Justices, 50 circuit court judges,
133 district court judges, and two to the U.S. Court of International
Trade.1 To put that number in perspective, there are 860 authorized
Article III judgeships.2 So President Trump’s appointees account for
roughly one-fifth of the entire Article III federal judiciary. Enormous
resources have been dedicated to this process, including millions of
dollars and thousands of hours by outside organizations like the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) and other interest groups.3
Yet this focus on Article III judges is myopic. The federal judiciary
today expands far beyond Article III. And I am not referring to just
the 50 or so Article I judges who populate the territorial courts, the

Copyright © 2020 Christopher J. Walker.
† Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. This Essay builds
on the Author’s introductory remarks at the Duke Law Journal’s 50th Annual Administrative
Law Symposium: Charting the New Landscape of Administrative Adjudication.
1. See, e.g., Colby Itkowitz, 1 in Every 4 Circuit Court Judges Is Now a Trump Appointee,
WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2019, 7:32 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/one-in-everyfour-circuit-court-judges-is-now-a-trump-appointee/2019/12/21/d6fa1e98-2336-11ea-bed5-880264cc91a9
_story.html [https://perma.cc/TP9D-JGK9]. See generally Judicial Appointment Tracker,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 19, 2020) [hereinafter Judicial Appointment Tracker],
https://www.heritage.org/judicialtracker [https://perma.cc/T9GK-CPAW].
2. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS 8 (2018),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/allauth.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD3R-A55U].
3. See, e.g., Paul Kane, Senate Democrats Vastly Outspent by Right in Gorsuch Fight, WASH.
POST (Mar. 18, 2017, 3:57 PM), http://wapo.st/2n1dcrc?tid=ss_tw [https://perma.cc/JU7H-9A7M]
(reporting Republican Party estimates that $3.3 million were spent on ads to support the
confirmation of now-Justice Gorsuch); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 1, 1–3 (2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/Backgrounder.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FXX6-NAW9] (detailing the ABA’s judicial-nominee evaluation process that has
operated since 1953).
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Court of Federal Claims, the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, and the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.4 The
overwhelming bulk of federal adjudication today takes place in federal
agencies. There are more than 1900 administrative law judges
(“ALJs”) in the federal administrative judiciary,5 plus more than
10,000 non-ALJ agency adjudicators who conduct evidentiary hearings
that are required by statute or regulation.6 And these adjudicators do
not engage in the hundreds of thousands of less-formal adjudications
in countless regulatory contexts, conducted by tens of thousands of
other agency officials.7
To provide just one point of comparison, through January 2020
the Trump administration’s Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has hired
more immigration judges (248) than the Senate has confirmed Article
III judges (187)—in total, more than half of immigration judges
nationwide (466).8 Yet there is no ABA committee that rates proposed
immigration judges or other agency adjudicators. There are no
television ads run. The Senate plays no role in their selection—though
Congress of course retains its oversight and appropriations authority.
The president also oversees administrative adjudications to some
degree. Indeed, earlier this year, the Office of Management and
Budget (“OMB”) announced an ambitious plan to reassess agency
adjudications in order to ensure that they “operate subject to

4. There are four Article I territorial judges and 16 judges on the Article I Court of Federal
Claims. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 2. And there are currently 19 Article I
judgeships on the Tax Court, see 26 U.S.C. § 7443(a) (2018), five Article I judgeships on the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces, see 10 U.S.C. § 942(a) (2018), and between three and seven
Article I judgeships on the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, see 38 U.S.C. § 7253(a) (2018).
5. Administrative Law Judges, U.S. OFF. PERSONNEL MGMT. (Mar. 2017),
https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency
[https://perma.cc/98A2-SWGD].
6. Kent Barnett & Russell Wheeler, Non-ALJ Adjudicators in Federal Agencies: Status,
Selection, Oversight, and Removal, 53 GA. L. REV. 1, 22 n.119, 32 (2019).
7. See Christopher J. Walker, Constitutional Tensions in Agency Adjudication, 104 IOWA L.
REV. 2679, 2703 & n.166 (2019).
8. Compare Itkowitz, supra note 1 (reporting that, as of December 19, 2019, 187 Trumpappointed Article III judges had been confirmed), with EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW, ADJUDICATION STATISTICS: IMMIGRATION JUDGE (IJ) HIRING (Jan. 2020) (noting 466
total immigration judges as of January 2020, 92 of whom were hired in fiscal year (“FY”) 2019,
while 28 were hired in the first quarter of FY2020), and Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
EOIR Announces Largest Ever Immigration Judge Investiture (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/eoir-announces-largest-ever-immigration-judge-investiture [https://perma.cc/
Q9U3-5SMS] (“Since the end of January 2017, 128 immigration judges have been sworn in.”).
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requirements that ensure they are fair, speedy, accurate, transparent,
and respectful of the rights of Americans.”9
This Charting the New Landscape of Administrative Adjudication
Symposium, which commemorates the Duke Law Journal’s 50th
annual administrative law symposium,10 thus arrives at a crucial time.
Indeed, in many ways, the Symposium returns us to the beginning of
the modern administrative state and the first years of the Duke Law
Journal’s annual administrative law symposium. After all, the founders
of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) of 1946 were primarily
concerned with administrative adjudication.11 That continued to be the
case for two decades after the APA’s enactment.12 Then, in the 1960s
and 1970s, courts, scholars, and policymakers turned their attention to
rulemaking—perhaps viewing it as a more democratic and legitimate
mode of administration.13 Professors Daniel Farber and Anne Joseph
O’Connell effectively illustrate this shift by looking at the evolution of
administrative law casebooks:
[A]s late as 1974, the Gellhorn and Byse casebook in the field devoted
only twenty-two pages to rulemaking proceedings, which mostly was
a lengthy excerpt from a single case limiting the use of formal
rulemaking. By contrast, it devoted two chapters (281 pages) to
adjudication. . . . Even more strikingly, the first edition of the Davis
casebook in 1951 dedicated only three pages to notice-and-comment
rulemaking, though it gave a whole chapter to formal rulemaking,
which uses essentially adjudicatory techniques.14

In the past few years, however, administrative adjudication has
begun to receive renewed attention—and scrutiny. The Supreme Court
has recently considered constitutional questions regarding the
appointment of ALJs15 and the limits of agency adjudication under
9. Request for Information: Improving and/or Reforming Regulatory Enforcement and
Adjudication, 85 Fed. Reg. 5482, 5483 (Jan. 30, 2020).
10. For more on the 50-year history of the annual administrative law symposium, see
Randolph J. May, Foreword: The Symposium at Fifty, 69 DUKE L.J. 1681 (2020).
11. See generally George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1575–77 (1996).
12. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law,
92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1143–44 (2014).
13. See Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 456 (1986)
(describing an emerging need for rulemaking to complement a spate of new statutes in the 1960s
and 1970s).
14. Farber & O’Connell, supra note 12, at 1144.
15. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018) (considering whether ALJs are “Officers”
within the meaning of Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution).
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Article III.16 In response to Lucia v. SEC,17 the president issued an
executive order that radically alters the process for selecting and
appointing ALJs,18 and DOJ has issued similar guidance to federal
agencies.19 Several large-scale studies of agency adjudicators and
adjudicative procedures have been published.20 These studies have
greatly informed an increasingly robust debate about the current
landscape and future of administrative adjudication. This debate has
high stakes for matters of national concern, most notably in the areas
of patent law and immigration.
The contributions to this Symposium nicely capture and advance
the debate. Professor Emily Bremer sets the stage by mapping out the
great diversity of adjudicative systems in the modern regulatory state
and arguing for more uniformity in those systems.21 The former
observation has been an emerging theme in the literature. For instance,
in 2016, the Administrative Conference of the United States
recognized an important tripart categorization of agency adjudicative
systems: Type A adjudication is the classic, formal adjudication
prescribed by the APA and normally presided over by an ALJ; Type
B adjudication is similarly formal but occurs outside of the APA’s
formal-adjudication provisions, where non-ALJ agency adjudicators
are required to hold a hearing by a statute, regulation, or executive
order; and Type C adjudication is the residual category for less-formal
adjudications where no evidentiary hearing is required.22
In other words, the new landscape of administrative adjudication
is yet another example of Farber and O’Connell’s “lost world of
administrative law” in that “the actual workings of the administrative
state have increasingly diverged from the assumptions animating the
16. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370
(2018).
17. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
18. Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 13, 2018).
19. Memorandum from the Solicitor General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Agency Gen.
Counsels, Guidance on Administrative Law Judges After Lucia v. SEC (S. Ct.) (July 2018).
20. See, e.g., MICHAEL ASIMOW, ADJUDICATION OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT (Admin. Conf. U.S. ed., 2016), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/adjudication-outside-the-administrative-procedure-act-updated-draft-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7JTH-J2VF]; Barnett & Weaver, supra note 6.
21. Emily S. Bremer, Reckoning with Adjudication’s Exceptionalism Norm, 69 DUKE L.J.
1749 (2020).
22. Adoption of Recommendations, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,312, 94,314–15 (Dec. 23, 2016). The
ABA adopted the same categorization a decade earlier. See AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 114
(Feb. 2005), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/administrative_law_
judiciary/resolution_114.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/88ZY-A3Y3].
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APA and classic judicial decisions that followed.”23 As Bremer
underscores, however, it is not a new world just because the vast
majority of adjudications take place outside of the formal provisions of
the APA; there is also an APA-departing norm of “exceptionalism” in
the new world of agency adjudication—“a presumption in favor of
procedural specialization and against uniform, cross-cutting
procedural requirements.”24 Bremer chronicles this new world of
exceptionalism,
ultimately
concluding
that
administrative
25
adjudications should be more uniform. Such a move toward
uniformity—perhaps accomplished by creating a federal
administrative adjudication “bill of rights” of sorts—would be, in my
view, a welcome development. It would not at all surprise me if OMB’s
current efforts to reform administrative adjudication moved in that
direction and drew substantially from Bremer’s important contribution
to this Symposium.
Professor Kent Barnett’s contribution turns to the constitutional
tensions in agency adjudication introduced by recent Supreme Court
decisions.26 As Barnett explains, there is a tension between political
control and independence: agency heads now have the ability to
remove agency adjudicators essentially at will—thus risking the
decisional independence and impartiality due process may require—
and Congress lacks the authority to protect such agency adjudicators
from at-will removal.27 Barnett proposes a novel solution to this
constitutional quandary: drawing on principles of internal
administrative law, he suggests that the executive branch should bind
itself by promulgating impartiality regulations that reinstate a meritbased appointment process as well as a good-cause removal standard
and accompanying procedural protections from removal.28
This is a fascinating proposal—one that merits consideration by
OMB in its current efforts and by subsequent presidential
administrations that may be even more interested in ensuring

23. Farber & O’Connell, supra note 12, at 1140. Melissa Wasserman and I have compared
and contrasted these lost and new worlds of agency adjudication in greater detail. See Christopher
J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV.
141, 148–57 (2019).
24. Bremer, supra note 21, at 1752.
25. Id. at Part III.
26. Kent Barnett, Regulating Impartiality in Agency Adjudication, 69 DUKE L.J. 1695 (2020).
27. See id. at Part I (discussing, inter alia, Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2020);
Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958)).
28. See id. at Part III.
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impartiality in agency adjudication. If the proposal sounds familiar,
that is because it is modeled after DOJ’s special-counsel regulations
that facilitated Robert Mueller’s high-profile investigation of the 2016
presidential election.29 If Barnett’s approach is adopted, it will be
interesting to see if litigants—or future administrations that may
disagree with the impartiality regulations—raise constitutional
concerns with the regulations or otherwise argue that the president
nevertheless retains the constitutional authority to remove agency
adjudicators at will.30 And it will be even more fascinating to see how
the courts deal with such challenges.
The final two contributions take an empirical turn. Professors
Catherine Kim and Amy Semet explore the role of presidential
ideology in immigration adjudication—one of the most prominent
Type B adjudications in the new landscape of agency adjudication.31
There is a rich empirical literature on immigration adjudication, which
largely underscores the disparities in rulings among immigration judges
and the importance of legal representation (or the lack thereof) in
adjudicative outcomes.32 Using a dataset of more than 600,000

29. See id. at Part III.A.1 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1–600.10 (2018)).
30. Compare Steven G. Calabresi, Mueller’s Investigation Crosses the Legal Line, WALL ST.
J. (May 13, 2018, 1:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/muellers-investigation-crosses-the-legalline-1526233750 [https://perma.cc/QK8W-2V8C] (“Mr. Mueller’s investigation has crossed a
constitutional line, for reasons the U.S. Supreme Court made clear in the 1988 case Morrison v.
Olson. . . . Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s opinion for the court, while upholding the statute,
set forth limits that the Mueller investigation has exceeded.”), with George Conway, The Terrible
Arguments Against the Constitutionality of the Mueller Investigation, LAWFARE (June 11, 2018,
5:54 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/terrible-arguments-against-constitutionality-muellerinvestigation [https://perma.cc/6UU4-7KUH] (disagreeing with Professor Calabresi because,
inter alia, “the special counsel regulations can be unilaterally revoked by the very executive
branch that unilaterally created them”), and Josh Blackman, Can the Special Counsel Regulations
Be Unilaterally Revoked?, LAWFARE (July 5, 2018, 7:22 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/canspecial-counsel-regulations-be-unilaterally-revoked [https://perma.cc/573V-F4F8] (“Conway is
probably correct, but there is enough doubt on the point that courts could sufficiently impede the
president’s rescission power to raise precisely the sort of separation-of-powers problem his piece
argues does not exist.”).
31. Catherine Y. Kim & Amy Semet, Presidential Ideology and Immigrant Detention, 69
DUKE L.J. 1855 (2020).
32. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access To Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30–44 (2015) (finding disparities between judges in
granting immigrants additional time to find counsel); David Hausman, The Failure of Immigration
Appeals, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1177, 1213 (2016) (finding immigrants are treated unequally because
immigration judges differ in how much help they provide immigrants in finding counsel); Jaya
Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007) (noting that represented asylum seekers
were granted asylum at a rate almost three times as high as those without legal counsel).
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individual custody decisions, Kim and Semet find that “on every metric
of bond hearings, noncitizens fared worse during the Trump Era than
they did during either the Bush II or Obama Eras.”33 These findings
contribute greatly to an important inquiry into the role that
presidential influence or political control plays in agency adjudication.
This issue has taken on extra significance following the rise of political
control of agency adjudication documented by Barnett in his
Symposium article.34
In their contribution to the Symposium, Professors Michael
Frakes and Melissa Wasserman shed empirical light on trademark
adjudication at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”),35 a
fitting complement to their previous pathbreaking empirical work on
patent adjudication at the USPTO.36 In this study, they study decisions
by trademark-examining attorneys, thus moving beyond Type A and
Type B adjudication, and passing into the realm of Type C
adjudication. And this is another high-volume adjudicative system. For
instance, their dataset includes more than 7.8 million trademark
applications adjudicated by more than 1300 trademark-examining
attorneys from 1982 to the present.37 On a variety of measures, they
find “substantial variation in outcomes across trademark-examining
attorneys,” which “remains true even after accounting for a rich degree
of application characteristics that may also impact these outcomes.”38
Such disparities, they rightly point out, raise essential questions of
fairness, equity, and social welfare—concerns shared throughout the
new landscape of administrative adjudication.
This Symposium charts much of the important terrain in the new
landscape of administrative adjudication. Our federal judiciary today
has moved far beyond Article III courts. We have also moved beyond
the APA’s vision of the federal administrative judiciary, which consists
of ALJs conducting hearings under the APA’s formal-adjudication
provisions. Today, the vast majority of federal adjudications take place
outside of Article III courts and APA formal adjudications. In

33. Kim & Semet, supra note 31, at 1865.
34. See Barnett, supra note 26, at Part I.
35. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Are There as Many Trademark Offices as
Trademark Examiners?, 69 DUKE L.J. 1807 (2020).
36. See, e.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Patent Office Cohorts, 65 DUKE
L.J. 1601, 1601–02 (2016) (finding the year that a USPTO “examiner was hired has a lasting effect
on her granting patterns over the course of her career”).
37. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 35, at Part III.A.
38. Id. at Part IV.
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particular, more than 10,000 other agency adjudicators hold hearings
to adjudicate hundreds of thousands of matters each year. And
thousands more adjudicate matters without even a hearing. It is safe to
conclude that this Symposium will not be the last word on the new
landscape of administrative adjudication. But the contributions in this
Symposium will no doubt help frame those debates and discussions for
years to come.

